“会计管理”翠屏经管论坛

时间：2026年8月25日8:00-19:00

地点：经管学院A0410室

1）报告题目：High-Speed Rail and the Governance of Intercity Technology Transactions

报告人信息：孙大鑫（南京大学） 

报告人简介：孙大鑫，南京大学工程管理学院副研究员。研究领域包括重大基础设施工程与创新地理；国家创新政策与企业创新策略；新兴战略产业创新扩散等。博士毕业于上海交通大学。目前主持国家自然科学基金青年项目、教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目。入选2025年江苏省青年科技人才托举工程、2024年江苏省“双创博士”计划、2022年管理科学与工程学会“优秀博士学位论文奖励计划”、2025年上海市哲学社会科学优秀成果奖二等奖。在IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management、Long Range Planning, 管理科学学报等国际国内期刊发表多篇论文。

报告摘要：Improved spatial accessibility is often expected to expand markets for technology by lowering the costs of search, evaluation, negotiation, and post-agreement coordination across regions. We argue that this expectation is incomplete because patent licenses allocate legal control over technology, so lower interaction costs may also affect partner selection and license form. Studying China’s high-speed rail (HSR) expansion, we link patent-license transactions to HSR line openings and construct a directed city-pair-year panel of 80,561 observations from 2008 to 2020. Using log-linear dyadic models with directed-pair and endpoint-city-year fixed effects, we find that same-line HSR connection is associated with a shift in intercity patent licensing: more ordinary licenses, fewer exclusive or sole licenses, and fewer first-time licensor-licensee relationships. The shift appears across firm-to-firm, university-to-firm, and nonfirm-to-firm transactions and is most visible for younger and pre-grant patents. These findings advance understanding of how transportation infrastructure shapes markets for technology by changing the license forms, relationship margins, and patent stages through which technologies move across regions.

2）报告题目Subjective Performance Evaluation Types and Firm Innovation Modes

报告人信息：祖雅菲（东南大学）

报告人简介：祖雅菲，东南大学管理学（会计学）博士，澳大利亚国立大学联合培养博士，中国注册会计师。现任南京理工大学会计学系主任，副教授、博士生导师，入选南京市中青年拔尖人才，担任江苏省会计学会理事及数智会计专业委员会委员。主要研究方向为管理会计、管理控制与供应链管理，研究成果发表于Contemporary Accounting Research、《会计研究》等国内外权威期刊，累计发表论文二十余篇；主持国家自然科学基金青年项目、教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目等多项科研课题。教学方面，曾获江苏省第五届青年教师教学竞赛二等奖。

报告摘要:The incentive effect of subjective performance evaluation on innovation remains controversial, as prior studies have not distinguished among its specific subtypes. This paper examines the matching relationships between two types of subjective performance evaluation, namely subjective indicators and subjective adjustments, and firm innovation modes (incremental innovation and radical innovation). The results confirm the predicted matching relationships: subjective indicators foster incremental innovation through an interest-coordinating channel, whereas subjective adjustments stimulate radical innovation through a risk-taking channel. These matching relationships vary significantly across firms with different managerial shareholdings and risk preferences, and regional levels of social trust and marketization. An appropriate match between evaluation types and innovation modes is found to enhance firm performance. These findings contribute to the literature by clarifying the distinct roles of subjective evaluation subtypes in fostering different types of innovation, and offer practical implications for firms in designing performance evaluation systems that align with their strategic innovation. 

3）报告题目： Custodian Lenders and Controlling-Shareholder Expropriation

报告人：杨昊峄（温州肯恩大学）

报告人简介：杨昊峄，美国阿拉巴马大学金融学博士，现任温州肯恩大学金融系助理教授，美国精算师协会（Society of Actuaries, SOA）准精算师（ASA）。主要研究领域包括发展经济学、公司金融、银行与投资。研究成果发表于 Review of Accounting Studies、Journal of Corporate Finance、Journal of Business Ethics 等国际学术期刊。

报告摘要：We study a novel bank monitoring channel in China: when a bank lends to a listed firm while serving as custodian for connected institutional minority investors, this custodian lender gains private information and strong incentives to monitor the controlling shareholder. Using hand-matched data from 2003 to 2022, we find that custodian lenders reduce tunneling by 14% and related-party transactions by 23% of their sample means. The results are robust to firm fixed effects, a loan-maturity difference-in-differences design, and bank-by-year fixed effects. The effect concentrates in financing-type transactions and operates through both ex-ante scrutiny (fewer non-standard audit opinions) and ex-post deterrence (less regulatory enforcement), and is stronger for private firms, heavily pledged shareholders, and Big-4 banks. Our findings uncover an information-based bank monitoring channel in emerging-market corporate governance.