A recent study conducted by Qianqian Kong et al. has been published in Games and Economic Behavior. This research proposes a novel solution concept for cooperative games, refining the existing prebargaining set solutions, notably the reactive, semireactive, and Aumann-Davis-Maschler prebargaining sets. The work was completed collaboratively by Kong Qianqian and researchers from Maastricht University and Northwestern Polytechnical University.

The quasi-prekernel is a novel solution concept for cooperative games. It is a refinement of existing prebargaining set solutions, notably the reactive, semireactive, and Aumann-Davis-Maschler prebargaining sets. It contains the prekernel, and coincides with that solution on simple games except possibly on balanced simple games with all individual worths equal to zero. An axiomatic characterization based on reduced game properties is provided. The steady version, obtained by putting conditions on objecting and counterobjecting coalitions, is considered as well. Finally, by considering objecting and counterobjecting coalitions independent of specific players, the so-called excess prebargaining obtains, which is another novel solution concept.

Games and Economic Behavior is a top journal in the field of Game Theory. It is ranked as FMS A and ABS 3. The journal aims to publish general-interest papers that significantly advance the frontiers of game theory and its applications. Game theory applications cover a wide range of subjects in social, behavioral, mathematical and biological sciences.

This paper can be cited as:

Kong Qianqian, Peters Hans, Sun Hao (2026) The quasi-prekernel for cooperative games. Games and Economic Behavior, 158, 260-271.

A complete version of this paper can be accessed via:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825626000643